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Abstract
In a recent paper, Shim [21] presented a very interesting authentication scheme
for vehicular sensor networks. Shim claimed that the scheme is secure against
the highest adopted level of attack, namely the chosen-message attack (CID-
CMA). Nevertheless, we find that the proof in Shim’s paper does not actually
prove that the scheme is secure in this level. Instead, it can only ensure that
the scheme is secure in a strictly weaker level of attack, the adaptive chosen-
identity and no-message attack (CID-NMA). In this paper, first we show that
there exist some security risks in vehicular networks if a scheme, which is only
secure against CID-NMA but not CID-CMA, is deployed. Hence, having the
proof that the scheme is only CID-NMA is insufficient for the aforementioned
application. That is, Shim did not prove that the proposed scheme can resist
these kinds of attack. Here, we use a different approach to prove the scheme for
security against CID-CMA. We note that this proof is essential to ensure that
the scheme can indeed be used for the aforementioned scenario. In addition,
we also show that the batch verification of the scheme, proposed in the same
paper, may have non-negligible error. Two invalid signatures may give a positive
result. We further improve the batch verification part so that the error rate can
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be reduced to negligible level.
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1. Introduction
With the advancement of mobile technology, wireless networks have become
widely available. Car manufactures and telecommunication industries have
started to equip vehicles with wireless devices for interconnection. Cars can
communicate with other cars or the roadside infrastructure to improve driving
safety or exchange traffic information. These types of vehicular communication
networks are usually referred as vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). Within
the infrastructure of VANETs, privacy and security are the two major chal-
lenges. No driver wants to broadcast his/her real identity and current location
while in contrast, authentication is required at the same time. Otherwise, one
may send some wrong messages or pretend others to send messages. There are
many schemes in the literature (such as [24, 15, 14, 23]) that deal with these
two seeming contradictory requirements.
Recently, Shim [21] proposed a conditional privacy-preserving authentica-
tion scheme for vehicular sensor networks. It is based on an Identity-based
Signature (IBS) scheme proposed in the same paper. Shim adopted the security
definition and model of the IBS schemes in [20]. The security model is the nor-
mal existential unforgeable against adaptive chosen-identity and chosen-message
attack (CID-CMA), which is considered to be the strongest security notion of
IBS scheme. Under this notion, the adversary is allowed to query an extraction
oracle and a signing oracle. When it submits an identity to the extraction ora-
cle, it returns a private key corresponding to this identity. When it submits a
message and an identity to the signing oracle, it returns a valid signature corre-
sponding to this message and identity. After adaptively querying these oracles,
the adversary outputs a challenged identity, a challenged message and a valid
signature corresponding to this identity and message. The restriction is that:
the adversary is not allowed to query the challenged identity to the extraction
oracle and the challenged identity-message pair to the signing oracle. However,
it is allowed to query the signing oracle for the challenged identity with other
messages.
On the other side, in an adaptive chosen-identity and no-message attack
(CID-NMA), it is similar to CID-CMA except that no signing oracle is provided.
In other words, the adversary is not allowed to see any signature corresponding
to the challenged identity. If it happens to see a signature (of any message)
from this identity, it may produce some forged signatures or pretend to be this
identity to sign some messages. It is a strictly weaker security notion for IBS
scheme. If a scheme can only achieve CID-NMA security, it should not be used
in general except in the case that the identity can only produce one signature
in the whole life time (e.g. one-time signature [3, 19]).
This Work. The contribution of this paper can be categorized as follow:
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1. We find that there is a flaw in the proof of the IBS in [21]. Although it
is claimed to be CID-CMA, we show that the proof of the corresponding
theorem cannot attend the claimed security. Instead, only a strictly weaker
security, the CID-NMA can be achieved.
2. We describe a list of security risks in VANETs for deploying an authen-
tication scheme which is only CID-NMA secure. In other words, if the
scheme in [21] is used, it cannot prove that it can resist such kinds of
attacks.
3. We attempt to provide the correct proof for Shim’s IBS using a completely
different approach. In our proof, we show that the IBS scheme in [21] is
CID-CMA secure.
4. In addition, Shim also deployed a batch verification on the signature
scheme. We demonstrate that the false acceptance rate is non-negligible:
we can easily construct two invalid signatures such that when they are
batched together for verification, they become valid signatures. That is,
they can pass through the batch verification equation. We further modify
the batch verification part to reduce this false acceptance to a negligible
level, which is our final contribution in this paper.
2. Related Works
We discuss some of the related works here and explain why our improved
version has some advancement over existing works.
In the area of security and privacy of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs),
a number of research works have been done on anonymous authentication to en-
sure security and privacy. A majority of these schemes make use of pseudonyms
(e.g. [4, 24, 13]) or anonymous credentials (e.g. [9, 12]). A recent approach
is to use signature-based technique (e.g. [16, 7]) to achieve anonymous au-
thentication. All these schemes are suitable for authorization. However, these
pseudonym-based authentication schemes are prone to generate a huge revoca-
tion list, as pointed out in [21]. Another approcah is to deploy group signature
(e.g. [17, 18, 22]) to achieve anonymous authentication. But the verification
cost in group-signature-based schemes is too expensive for devices in VANETs
which may require very fast verification time. Similar to a group signature, a
ring signature [6, 25, 1] can also be used to provide privacy preserving capability.
By removing the need for a group manager and allowing a signer to create an ad-
hoc group membership, a ring signature scheme can be used for in applications
with the competing requirements of message authenticity and signer privacy.
However, facing the same obstacle as group signature, the verification of ring
signature is not efficient enough. On the other side, identity-based schemes (e.g.
[26, 21]) allow fast or batch verification that is particularly suitable for vehic-
ular communications. Nevertheless, the scheme in [26] required the long-term
system master key preloaded into all tamper-proof devices and the security rely
on it. In practice, these tamper-proof devices may be subjected to side-channel
attacks. The compromised of one device results in the leakage of the master
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secret key which is a serious security flaw in the whole system. The scheme in
[21] does not contain this risk, though there is a flaw in their security proof and
their batch verification is not always sound, as we mentioned in the last section.
We summarize the comparison among these cryptographic primitives in Ta-
ble 2.
Primitive
Efficient Efficient No tamper Batch Correct
Revocation Verification resist. device verification Proof
Pseudonym × × ✓ × ✓
Group signature × × ✓ × ✓
Ring signature ✓ × ✓ × ✓
IBS [26] ✓ ✓ × ✓ ✓
IBS [21] ✓ ✓ ✓ Na ×
Ours ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
a We will later show that the batch verification of [21] is not always correct.
Table 2. Comparison
3. Security Risks in VANETs for deploying an insecure scheme
In this section, we present some concrete security risks in VANETS if an
insecure scheme (or not secure enough in an acceptable level) is deployed as the
underlying security primitive.
3.1. Deploying a scheme which is only CID-NMA Secure - Message Forgery
We first demonstrate that by incorporating an Identity-based Signature
(IBS) scheme, which is only CID-NMA secure, in VANETs, then some prac-
tical security risks in the whole system may be presented.
In the following, we consider the same scenario as in [21]. There are some
communications between the road side unit (RSU) and vehicles. When the
RSU sends an authenticated message to vehicles, it uses the underlying IBS
scheme to sign a message. Upon receiving the message, the vehicle verifies the
signature corresponding to the RSU. If the scheme is only CID-NMA secure
but not CID-CMA secure, the vehicle cannot ensure that the received signature
is really signed by the RSU. This is because an adversary can pretend to be
the RSU to generate a valid message (once it has seen a valid signature by the
RSU), and hence, the authenticity is lost.
Additionally, when a vehicle sends an authenticated message to the RSU,
it signs the message with his/her pseudo-identity. When an adversary obtains
this signature from this pseudo-identity, it can produce another valid signature
for this pseudo-identity within the valid time period although it does not have
its private key. This may result in a message forgery. The adversary can then
deliberately send false and harmful messages using this pseudo-identity as it is
no longer accountable to the adversary but the pseudo-identity of the victim.
This results in the security breakdown of the whole system.
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3.2. False Acceptance on Batch Verification
In a batch verification, the whole batch would be dropped or rejected, even
if there is just one false signature in the batch. It should be a deterministic
process with no exception. Otherwise, a harmful message may get through the
batch verification process (that is, the authentication gateway) to jeopardize the
safety of the traffic system. An adversary may take advantage of this loophole
by injecting some harmful messages in each authentication cycle. This attack
may bring fatal traffic consequences for a VANET-based traffic system.
Roadmap. In the next section, we will show that the proof for the IBS in
[21] only shows that the scheme is secure against CID-NMA but not CID-CMA.
That is, Shim [21] did not prove that the proposed authentication scheme can
resist against the attack mentioned above. Due to the lack of this proof, then the
scheme in [21] may not be able to be adopted in the VANET scenario mentioned
in the original paper. Fortunately, in Section 5, we are able to provide the correct
proof so that the scheme achieves CID-CMA.
Subsequently, we show that the batch verification in [21] contains non-
negligible false acceptance rate in Section 6. We then propose a fix to the
batch verification process which can prevent the attack mentioned above.
4. Brief Review of the IBS scheme proposed in [21]
In this section, we briefly review the IBS scheme proposed in [21] and point
out the problem in the security proof. We first review some mathematical tools
used.
We denote the security parameter by k. Suppose G and GT are groups of
prime order q. We write the group operation in G additively1. The function
e ∶ G×G→ GT is a bilinear pairing such that ∀P,Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zq, e(aP, bQ) =
e(P,Q)ab; e(P,P ) generates GT if g is a generator of G. We require that the
group operations in G and GT , and the bilinear pairing e are computable in
polynomial time with respect to k. Let G(1k) be a probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) algorithm which outputs (G,GT , q, P, e), where P is the generator
of G and e ∶ G ×G→ GT is a bilinear pairing.
The following Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption is used in
[21].
Definition 1 (CDH assumption). Given g, xP, yP ∈ G where G is a group
of prime order q and x, y are randomly chosen from Zq, no adversary can output
xyP in polynomial time t with non-negligible probability ε. We denote it as the
(t, ε)-CDH assumption.
1[21] used the multiplicative notation in their definition but used the additive notation in
the rest of the paper.
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4.1. The Scheme
Shim [21] firstly proposed a standard signature scheme KSS which is sum-
marized as follow:
• Setup. On input the security parameter k, run (G,GT , q, P, e) ← G(1k)
where e ∶ G × G → GT is the bilinear pairing defined above such that
G and GT are groups of order q and P is a generator of G. Choose a
cryptographic hash function H1 ∶ {0,1}∗ → Zq. The public parameters are
param = (G,GT , q, P, e,H1).
• KeyGen. On input param, pick a random x ∈R Z∗q and Q ∈R G. Compute
Y = xP and set PK = (Y,Q) as the public key and SK = x as the secret
key.
• Sign. On input param, SK and a message m ∈ {0,1}∗, choose a random
number k ∈ Z∗q . Compute T = kP,h = H1(m,T ) and S = (x + hk)Q.
Output the signature σ = (T,S).
• Verify. On input param, PK,m and σ = (T,S), compute h =H1(m,T ) and
check if e(S,P ) = e(Y + hT,Q). If it holds, accept the signature.
Shim [21] adopted the definition and formal security model of existential
unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack (EUF-CMA) of standard
signatures in [11]. The author has also shown that the signature scheme KSS
is EUF-CMA secure if the CDH assumption holds.
Shim [21] proposed an identity-based signature scheme KIBS which is based
on KSS. Note that the extract algorithm of KIBS is the same as the signing
algorithm of KSS with the identity ID as message.
The scheme is described as follow:
• Setup. On input the security parameter k, run (G,GT , q, P, e) ← G(1k)
where e ∶ G×G→ GT is the bilinear pairing defined above such that G and
GT are groups of order q and P is a generator of G. Pick two more gener-
ators Q,Q′ ∈ G and a random s ∈R Z∗q . Compute Ppub = sP . Choose two
cryptographic hash functions H1 ∶ {0,1}∗ → Zq and H2 ∶ {0,1}∗ → Zq. The
public parameters are param = (G,GT , q, P,Q,Q′, Ppub, e,H1,H2). The
master secret key is s.
• Extract. On input param, s and an identity ID ∈ {0,1}∗, choose a random
number k ∈ Z∗q . Compute TID = kP,h =H1(ID,TID) and SID = (s+hk)Q.
Output the private key skID = (TID, SID).
• IB-Sign. On input param, skID, a message M ∈ {0,1}∗, choose a random
number r ∈ Z∗q . Compute U = rP , h′ = H2(ID,M,TID, U) and V =
h′SID + rQ′. Output the signature τ = (TID, U, V ).
• IB-Verify. On input param, ID,M and τ = (TID, U, V ), compute h =
H1(ID,TID), h′ =H2(ID,M,TID, U) and check if
e(V,P ) = e(h′ ⋅ [Ppub + hTID],Q) ⋅ e(U,Q′). (1)
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If it holds, accept the signature.
4.2. The Proof
Shim [21] proved that if KSS is EUF-CMA secure, then KIBS is secure
under the adaptive chosen identity and chosen message attack (CID-CMA).
CID-CMA security means that the adversary is allowed to ask for the private
keys of arbitrary identities and signatures of arbitrary messages. The adversary
wins if it can output a signature τ∗ for a message M∗ and an identity ID∗, such
that the private key of ID∗ was not asked and no signature on M∗ for ID∗ was
asked.
We find that the security proof of Theorem 3.2 in [21] only showed that
KIBS is secure under the adaptive chosen identity and no message attack (CID-
NMA). It is different from the CID-CMA that in the case of CID-NMA, no
signature on any message for ID∗ was allowed to ask by the adversary (the
adversary can still ask for the signature for other identities).
In the proof in [21], Shim simulated the IB-Sign query by requesting an
Extract query to KSS to obtain a private key, and then used it to run the IB-
Sign algorithm. Therefore, if the adversary asked an IB-Sign query on ID∗ and
some message M , it forces the simulator to request an Extract query on ID∗.
At the end of the security game, even if the adversary outputs a forgery and
the simulator extracts the private key of ID∗, the simulator still cannot use it
as a forgery of the KSS. It is because the simulator has asked this private key
before (during the IB-Sign query). Therefore, the simulator in the proof in [21]
cannot handle such IB-Sign query on ID∗ and hence it only achieves CID-NMA
security.
Another way to see the invalidity of the proof is the omission of H2 in
the security proof of KIBS. In the proof of KSS, H1 is used for rewinding
in the Forking Lemma and hence we require that H1 to be a cryptographic
hash function. On the other hand, no specific property of H2 is needed for the
security proof of KIBS [21]. It implies that H2 can be any arbitrary function,
without affecting the security. It is obviously incorrect: a collision on H2, such
as H2(ID,M1, TID, U) = H2(ID,M2, TID, U) for some M1 ≠M2, will result in
a forgery under the adaptive chosen message attack. Therefore, we should at
least require that H2 is collision resistant in the security proof.
5. Proof for CID-CMA secure
In this section, we provide a formal proof that KIBS is CID-CMA secure
assuming KSS is EUF-CMA secure using a different approach from the orig-
inal paper [21]. Looking ahead, our proof and Shim’s proof both follows the
reduction approach. The difference is that we show how to handle the signature
query on the challenge identity.
A typical reduction proof goes as follows. We assume on the contrary that
KIBS is not CID-CMA secure. That is, assume there exists an attacker A that
can forge a signature in KIBS under the adaptive chosen identity and chosen
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message attack. The proof’s goal is to show that under this assumption, KSS
is not EUF-CMA secure. We said we have reduced the security of KIBS to
the security of KSS, for if the former is insecure, so is the latter. Specifically,
we need to show the existence of another algorithm S that, with the help of
A, breaks to EUF-CMA security of KSS. Reduction proof in cryptography is
often constructive, that is, we show how to construct the algorithm S based on
the algorithm A.
proof : Let A be a forger of KIBS under the definition of CID-CMA security.
We show how to construct a forger S against KSS under the definition of EUF-
CMA security.
Under the definition of EUF-CMA security, S is given the public parameter
and public key of an instance of the KSS scheme. That is, it receives as in-
put (G,GT , q, P, e,H1, Y,Q). S’s goal is to output a message m∗ and a forged
signature σ∗ = (T ∗, S∗) of m∗ that passes the verification algorithm. That is,
h =H1(m∗, T ∗) ∧ e(S∗, P ) = e(Y + hT,Q).
In addition, as an EUF-CMA attacker, S can freely obtain signatures of any
messages of its choice. To model this, we say S is given an oracle, usually called
a signing oracle, OKSS that on input m, output a pair (S,T ) such that
h =H1(m,T ) ∧ e(S,P ) = e(Y + hT,Q).
For notational convenience, we shall denote the operation of the signing oracle
as (S,T ) ← OKSS(m). Of course, the natural restriction is that m∗ cannot be
an input to OKSS .
Below we show how S produces the forgery with the help of A.
• Setup. S creates the public parameter and public key of an instance of
KIBS as follows. It randomly selects a value α ∈R Zq, computes Q′ = Qα.
It also chooses a hash function H2. The public parameter is set as:
param = (G,GT , q, P, e,Ppub ∶= Y,Q,Q′,H1,H2).
param is given to A as the public parameter of an instance of KISS.
• Queries. As an CID-CMA attacker, A is entitled to freely obtain signing
key corresponds to any identity ID under the restriction that ID is not
the identity of the forged signature. Furthermore, A is allowed to obtain
the signature of any message on any identity. Again, the forgery should
not be on the message-identity tuple that has been queried. Below we
show how S provides the signing keys and signatures requested by A.
One point to note is that in the random oracle model, A cannot compute
the hash values of H2 by itself. It has to be obtained from S.
– H2 Query. A requests the hash value of the tuple (v1, v2, v3, v4). S
maintains a list L for the hash values issued so far. If (v1, v2, v3, v4)
does not exist in the list L, S returns a random value h′ ∈R Zq.
8
h′ is put on L with the tuple (v1, v2, v3, v4). On the other hand,
if (v1, v2, v3, v4) already exists in the list L, the corresponding h′ is
returned. This maintain the consistency of the hash function and at
the same time ensure the hash function H2 acts as a random function.
– Extraction Query. A requests the signing key for identity ID. S
issues (S,T ) ← OKSS(ID). S returns (SID ∶= S,TID = T ) to A as
the signing key of identity ID.
– Signature Query. A requests the signature for identity ID on message
m. Note that the following is different to the original proof from [21].
We extend the proof to handle the case when S does not know the
signing key of an identity ID. This is necessary in CID-CMA secu-
rity because A can request signatures for the challenge identity for
different messages. If there exists an extraction query with input ID,
S simply creates the signature using the corresponding signing key
(SID, TID). On the other hand, if ID has never been an input of the
extraction query, S does the following.
1. If this is the first time this ID is involved, S randomly generates
TID ∈R G, Otherwise, re-use the existing value of TID.
2. Compute h =H1(ID,TID).
3. Generate at random h′, k ∈R Zq.
4. Compute V = kQ.
5. Compute U = α−1(kP − h′(Ppub + hTID)).
6. Add (ID,m,TID, U), h′ to the list L. Note that this implicitly
sets H2(ID,m,TID, U) to have the value h′. The probability
that the tuple (ID,m,TID, U) already exists in L is negligible
since the value U depends on the random value k and is freshly
generated for each signature query.
S returns (TID, U, V ) as the signature on message m under identity
ID.
• Forgery. Finally, A outputs a forgery (m∗, ID∗, T ∗ID∗ , U∗, V ∗) (with some
non-negligible probability) such that
h = H1(ID∗, T ∗ID∗)
h′ = H2(ID∗,m∗, T ∗ID∗ , U∗)
e(V ∗, P ) = e(h′ ⋅ [Ppub + hT ∗ID∗],Q) ⋅ e(U∗,Q′).
• General Forking Lemma [2]. Let ε be the probability that A outputs a
valid forgery. Due to the general forking lemma, there exists a forking
algorithm that can obtain another tuple (m∗, ID∗, T ∗ID∗ , U∗, V̄ ∗) from A
(in another run of A using the same random coins for A) such that
h = H1(ID∗, T ∗ID∗)
h̄′ = H2(ID∗,m∗, T ∗ID∗ , U∗)
e(V̄ ∗, P ) = e(h̄′ ⋅ [Ppub + hT ∗ID∗],Q) ⋅ e(U∗,Q′)
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with probability greater than
ε(ε/∣L∣ − 1/q).
Note that ∣L∣ is the size of the list L which is the total number of hash
query made by A and that h̄′ ≠ h′. (Essentially, the forking algorithm
runs A twice, with the same random tape for A and that the hash queries
are answered differently from the point where A issues the hash query for
(ID∗,m∗, T ∗ID∗ , U∗).)
• Output of S. S computes S∗ = (h′ − h̄′)−1(V ∗ − V̄ ∗), sets T ∗ = T ∗ID∗ and
m∗ = ID∗ and outputs (S∗, T ∗) as the forgery on message m∗ in the
scheme KSS.
6. Batch Verification
In this section, we first review the batch verification part of the authentica-
tion scheme in [21]. Then we point out some cases such that when two invalid
signatures are batched verified, the algorithm outputs a positive result.
6.1. The original batch verification in [21]
The authentication scheme basically is the same as the underlying IBS KIBS
scheme, except that the identity ID is replaced by the pseudo-identity PID.
Hence we only review the batch verification part.
On input param and n distinct message-signature tuples ⟨PID1,M1, tt1, τ1⟩,
. . . , ⟨PIDn,Mn, ttn, τn⟩, where τi = (TPIDi , Ui, Vi) and tti is the current times-
tamp, the RSU performs the following procedures:
1. Compute hi =H1(PIDi, TPIDi) and h′i =H2(PIDi,Mi, tti, TPIDi , Ui) for
i = 1, . . . , n.
2. Verify whether
e
⎛
⎝
n
∑
i=1
Vi, P
⎞
⎠
= e
⎛
⎝
[
n
∑
i=1
h′i] ⋅ Ppub +
n
∑
i=1
h′ihiTPIDi ,Q
⎞
⎠
⋅ e
⎛
⎝
n
∑
i=1
Ui,Q
′
⎞
⎠
(2)
holds or not. If it holds, accept the signatures.2
6.2. False Acceptance
Next, we show that when two invalid signatures are batched together for
verification, equation (2) gives a positive result.
Assume τ1 = (TPID1 , U1, V1) and τ2 = (TPID2 , U2, V2) are two valid signatures
on the message-identity tuples ⟨PID1,M1, tt1⟩ and ⟨PID2,M2, tt2⟩ respectively.
2We note that there is a typo in the original paper in [21]. The first term on the right hand
side of the equation [∑ni=1 h′i] was wrongly written as [∑ni=1 hi]. We correct the typo here.
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That is, they pass through equation (1) for individual verification. Definitely
they can also pass through equation (2) for batch verification.
Now we change the signatures to τ ′1 = (TPID1 , U1, V ′1) and τ ′2 = (TPID2 , U2, V ′2)
where V ′1 = V1+a⋅P and V ′2 = V2−a⋅P for some a ∈ Z∗q . Obviously, ⟨PID1,M1, tt1, τ ′1⟩
and ⟨PID2,M2, tt2, τ ′2⟩ cannot pass through equation (1). In other words, these
two signatures are invalid. However, when they are batched together for verifi-
cation, they can pass through equation (2). This is due to the term a ⋅ P in V ′1
has been canceled by the term −a ⋅ P in V ′2 .
6.3. An Improved batch verification
This kind of false acceptance can be avoided by adding the well-known small
exponents test ([8, 10, 5]). The patch is as follow:
1. For batch verifying n signatures, choose δi ∈R {0,1}` for i = 1, . . . , n, where
` is a security parameter such that the probability of accepting a bad pair
is 2−`. (The false acceptance rate was proven as Theorem 3.1 in [10].
Readers may refer to that paper for the details.) The size of ` is a trade-
off between efficiency and security. Usually ` = 80 should be enough for
normal scenario in VANETs.
2. Compute hi =H1(PIDi, TPIDi) and h′i =H2(PIDi,Mi, tti, TPIDi , Ui) for
i = 1, . . . , n.
3. Verify whether
e
⎛
⎝
n
∑
i=1
δi ⋅ Vi, P
⎞
⎠
= e
⎛
⎝
n
∑
i=1
(h′i ⋅ δi) ⋅ (Ppub + hiTPIDi),Q
⎞
⎠
⋅ e
⎛
⎝
n
∑
i=1
δi ⋅Ui,Q′
⎞
⎠
holds or not. If it holds, accept the signatures.
We note that an attack such as what we illustrated earlier will no longer be
applicable after applying our patch as described above.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that the underlying IBS scheme in [21] cannot
achieve an acceptable security level. The risks are twofold: (i) the proof of the
IBS scheme in [21] can only ensure that the scheme is secure against CID-NMA,
which is a strictly weaker security level than the normal CID-CMA; (ii) the batch
verification part of the authentication scheme in [21] has a non-negligible false
acceptance rate. We also showed that by deploying a scheme with the above
risks, there exists some practical implications on security in VANETs. Finally,
we provide improvements to fix the two loopholes so that the IBS should be
secure enoguh to be used in VANETs.
There are two future research directions: The first one is to develop an IBS
with batch verification without pairing. Pairing is a costly mathematical algo-
rithm that requires relatively expensive computation power. Although batch
verification can greatly reduce the number of pairing operations, we still require
11
3 pairing in our improvement. We leave it as a future research to construct an
IBS with batch verification without pairing so that lightweight device such as
smart card can easily execute. By then, it will give more flexibility for engi-
neers or researchers to design the infrastructure of VANET. The second one is
to shorten the length of the signature. Currently the signature consists of three
group elements. If the signature can be further shorten, the communication cost
will be reduced accordingly.
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